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ABSTRACT

CTF platforms are based on virtual machines and can be either
centralized, i.e. to host on-site competitors, or decentralized, i.e.
to host remote competitors connecting through Virtual Private
Network (VPN) connections.

Cybersecurity gaming is popularized through capture-the-flag
(CTF) competitions, war games, and forensic challenges.
Providing actual hands-on experience, the cybersecurity
competitions have great potential to support classroom learning,
professional skill development, and scenario testing. To capitalize
this, the supporting gaming platforms need to overcome the
following issues: i) A complex virtualized infrastructure that
requires extensive resources and administration, ii) Lack of
support for real-time cyberoperations within a competition
environment, and iii) implementation of independent, real-time
scoring system which tracks progress and determines results of
the competitors. In response to these issues, we have developed
Cyber Operations RangE (CORE) - a containerized cybersecurity
gaming platform. This paper presents the design, implementation,
and the application of the CORE platform for real-time
cyberoperations competitions.

War games are similar to the jeopardy-style CTF competitions,
but the challenges increase in difficulty as the competitor
progresses. In the forensic challenges, competitors are also
provided identical problems in the domain of cyber forensics.
These are solved independently and solutions are submitted to the
remote gaming platform. Unlike the CTFs, the forensic challenges
last several months and are held annually. The teams are scored
on their solutions after the competition is closed.
Traditionally, the jeopardy-style CTF competitions have been the
most popular cyberforensics gaming events [4]. While these CTFs
support classroom learning and professional skills development
[6], [7], the attack-defense contests are more effective for the
experiential learning because they represent more realistic
cybersecurity scenario [8], [9]. Despite this advantage, the attackdefense CTFs are rarely seen within cybersecurity gamification
because they require complex gaming infrastructure that includes
virtualization, scoring administration tasks, and abundance of
resources [2] [4]. Also, the competitor is expected to multitask
between administrative tasks and the challenges, instead of
focusing solely on the competition.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.3.1 [Computers and Education]: Computer Uses in Education
– computer-managed instruction (CMI).

General Terms
Security

Keywords
Cybersecurity
education,
cybersecurity
cyberoperations skills, containerization.

In response to this, we developed a novel, container-based gaming
infrastructure for cyberoperations competitions, the Cyber
Operations RangE (CORE). The CORE platform eliminates the
burden of a complex virtualized hosting infrastructure by
replacing it with Docker containers and a real-time scoring
engine. The administration is highly simplified and enables rapid
instantiation of varied sized competitions and numerous
challenges. To our knowledge, CORE is the first platform that
extends beyond the classical notion of attack-defense CTFs and
provides a true cyberoperations experience of attacking,
defending, and live forensics. Competitors are not solely scored
on the submitted flags, but also on the tactical approach they
employ in the contest. Instead of level-based game progress,
CORE forces competitors to conduct immediate cyberoperations
action. They need to perform real-time forensics as part of their
defensive strategy, unlike traditional forensics challenges with
excluded time constraints. The remainder of this paper describes
the design and the technical implementation of CORE platform,
discusses the potential range of applications, and outlines the
future testing and development plans.

gamification,

1. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity competitions are the most popular hands-on
exercise for security enthusiasts, students, educators, and
professionals [1]. They range from capture-the-flag (CTF)
competitions, war games, or forensics challenges [2], [3]. The
CTF gaming structure provides identical challenges for each
competitor (often organized in teams) in the domain of operating
systems security, network/software/web security, cryptography
and hash-functions, reverse engineering, and cyber forensics. The
contests are organized either in a “jeopardy-style” or “attackdefense” competition format [4]. In the jeopardy-style contests,
there are no predefined orders for solving the challenges and the
competitors are free to progress through each of the equalduration contest rounds. In the attack-defense contests, the
competitors are given identical game boxes (virtual machines)
which contain pre-loaded vulnerabilities and required to patch
vulnerabilities while exploiting other game boxes [5]. Almost all
1
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(every given amount of minutes). For many competitors, this
scoring implementation keeps the game at a slower pace and gives
them time to recover if they were compromised. In the CORE
environment, a competitor is either penalized or rewarded on
checks failing/succeeding. This aspect of the scoring engine gives
CORE a more realistic setting for an attack/defense competition.

Most of the attack-defense CTFs borrow the design from the iCTF
competition [10]. The gaming boxes are packaged into virtual
machines that competitors access locally (on their hardware, i.e.,
centralized gaming infrastructure) or remotely via SSH (hosted on
the competition server, i.e., decentralized gaming infrastructure).
Authors in [4] show that the virtualized infrastructure requires
extensive resources and administration: the memory usage for
hosting a competition proportionally increases with the number of
players (virtual machines) with around 5GB for 5 players up to
40GB for 40 players for fixed number of services.

3. CORE – INFRASTRUCTURE
OPERATIONS
3.1 Systems Architecture
The CORE architecture is shown in Figure 1. CORE assumes
remote competitors; therefore, the client’s Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) VPN traffic is routed to CORE’s edge request routing tier.
SSL offloading is necessary to relieve the CPU processing burden
on the base nodes. The competition traffic is further routed
through load balancing peers operating on OSI Layer 4 to the base
node tier, where each of the competitors are dispatched to their
competition gaming boxes (implemented in Docker containers). A
total of four environments or "pods" have been depicted, of which
the gaming boxes reside in. CORE has the capability to deploy
parallel production and development environments (indicated as
ENV-A-PRD/ENV-B-PRD and ENV-A-DEV/ENV-B-DEV) for
flexible development and on-the-fly changes between different
cybersecurity contests. At a high level, the motivation behind
CORE architecture was twofold: 1) ensure horizontal scalability,
and 2) support competition-level exercise isolation (infrastructure
security). Authoring custom systems automation tooling was
imperative for us to achieve both goals.

To overcome the virtualization and multitasking problems, they
modified the iCTF design to develop competition infrastructure
based on Docker containers [4]. The proposed gaming platform
replaces the virtual machines with Docker containers and adds
container image registry, gaming server, and flags volume
modules to the infrastructure. The container image registry stores
competitors’ gaming boxes - service and exploit containers hosts on a single server and provides period synchronization with their
images on the game server. The service container hosts are
predefined competition game boxes, while the exploit containers
are hosts developed by each of the competitors (or teams) with
custom set of exploits. The competition has several gaming
rounds that each consists of: service container synchronization,
exploit container synchronization, planting flags, running exploits,
and retrieving flags. The gameplay closely resembles bug fixing
in software development and the competitors are scored based on
their ability to fix the issues (i.e., capture the planted flags).
The CORE platform also utilizes Docker containers to address the
virtualization complexities and the extensive requirements for
resource and administration. Relative to other competitions [4],
CORE does not require the usage of proprietary VM automation
software. As discussed in section 3.1.1.3 below, CORE has an
authored custom automation (reliant on open-source software) for
the provisioning of the minimalist operating systems on which the
containers run on. Other virtualization environments, such as the
National Center for Systems Security and Information Assurance
(CSSIA), rely on closed-source software from the Network
Development Group (NDG), which advertises subscription rates
from $30 through $175 USD per participant [11].
Contrasting with [4], the CORE gaming resembles a real-time
cyberoperations to address the lack of such cybersecurity gaming
experiences. Unlike the SANS NetWars [12], CORE competitors
are not required to progress through levels during the contest and
they can engage immediately in cyberoperations action. Instead of
separating the attacking (exploit containers) and defending
(service containers) tasks and having a gaming server to act as a
“red-team”, CORE includes the attacking and defending in a one
monolithic gaming box (container) to allow them to engage in
real-time. CORE adds live forensics tasks to complement the
defense in attributing the attack and craft another one in response.
In addition to these two design aspects, CORE incorporates realtime scoring engine which tracks players progress every second.
This is implemented in order for players to see whether their
machines have been compromised and to validate whether they
have found pre-installed malicious programs. In comparison with
other CTF environments, the scoring is based either upon whether
a flag has been captured, or whether a service is still running

Figure 1: CORE Service Architecture

3.1.1.

Platform Scalability

Horizontal scalability refers to the practice of “scaling out” our
systems infrastructure to handle an increase in system load. In
other words, we are not attempting to “scale up” (i.e., vertically
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scaling) system resources. This allows for high availability and
agility: instead of having a single high performance server handle
the entire traffic load, we are able to dynamically load balance
across available servers with less provisioned resources. We
accept the fact that failures will occur on our platform and as a
result, we employ resilient technologies that are able to tolerate
multiple individual failures. Large scale data center operators
have researched such techniques at length [13].

The data structure cluster is a critical component of our systems
architecture. Thus, we must ensure that it is highly available and
resilient, due to its stateful nature. High availability is achieved by
the underlying algorithm [14] that empowers the cluster services
such as leader election and node health checks: after initial
bootstrapping, the cluster is able to determine if a node fails since
health checks are sent out at regular intervals. If a majority of the
cluster returns non-HTTP 200 status codes, the on-call engineer is
paged. Data resiliency is achieved since this algorithm’s goal is to
ensure replicated logs. For a given cluster of size N, the failure
tolerance would be (N-1)/2). As a result, we run our cluster in odd
numbers to ensure logs are written to it if multiple base nodes
become unavailable. If the minimum is not satisfied, replicated
logs will not be committed to the cluster and the cluster’s health
will be degraded. The end result of our data structure cluster
deployment is a fault-tolerant, replicated state machine.

In our environment, platform scalability is achieved through
multiple methods: highly available load balancers, a distributed
data structure cluster, custom system automation tooling,
networked storage infrastructure, and container network fabrics.

3.1.1.1. Request Load Balancing
A horizontally scalable architecture typically includes load
balancers (LB) to route users to various application end-points.
CORE load balancers were designed to: (1) provide OSI Layer 4
load balancing services, (2) be highly available, and (3) route
users to exactly one gaming box (container). In our environment,
LB services at OSI Layer 4 is necessary since containers bind to a
pre-defined range of TCP/UDP ports to serve HTTP traffic.
Utilizing ports as an identifier for application nodes strategically
eliminated any possibility for IPv4 address exhaustion of the
production subnet. Furthermore, in the CORE design, Layer 4 was
determined to be logically sound because base nodes (identified as
an IPv4 address) host many containers (identified by multiple
TCP/UDP ports). High availability is achieved by integrating N+1
(active-passive) redundancy in our architecture and running
Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP) between the LBs.
N+1 redundancy is our first step taken to eliminate potential
single point of failures in our architecture, despite the fact that the
failover mechanism may be one. As we scale, we plan to perform
1+1 (active-active) redundancy with respect to a given
environment. With VRRP, we can define a Virtual IP address
(VIP), which migrates to a passive LB in the event one LB
unexpectedly halts. Users navigate to a portal domain name
(where the DNS A record is the VIP) for the environment with a
specific user identifier in the HTTP path. LB Access Control Lists
(ACLs) match the UID in question and load balance the user to
that container, if no other connections have been established. If an
invalid request is made, the LB will serve a HTTP 5XX error to
the client. Because the LBs are aware of the competition boxes,
we can set a limit of one connection to a container at any given
time – also assisting us with achieving our goal of exercise
isolation. That way, we provide another layer of security to
prevent users from attempting to connect to other containers.

3.1.1.3. Pod Abstraction
As demonstrated in Figure 1, we have isolated each
“environment” into its own “pod”. Although these terms are used
interchangeably, pods in CORE are referring specifically to a pod
in our container orchestration infrastructure. As we deploy our
container orchestration solution, this will become more apparent.
Abstracting away a container’s functionality into a group of
multiple containers is logically sound in our cyber range. We
think of a pod as an exercise. This would contribute to a
centralized user interface of which a competition operator can
launch, run, and teardown competitions. Furthermore, competition
operators can control compute, storage, and network resource
limitations and provision more if necessary. Otherwise, it would
become laborious for the operator responsible for administering
the competition to manually run scripts and perform ad-hoc tasks
as the infrastructure scales. The ability for container orchestration
to scale our pods across multiple base nodes removes the
necessity to create tooling to manage a given competition.

3.1.1.4. Systems Automation Tooling
We have implemented proprietary infrastructure-as-code
initiatives extensively. There are numerous benefits to doing this
(which are outside the scope of this paper), such as reduced
human error. For instance, we have leveraged YAML manifests to
cover base node provisioning, eliminating any manual
bootstrapping. Furthermore, custom infrastructure tooling has
been developed to automate authorized remote command
execution. Software deployments are scoped into our tooling
efforts as well. As of this writing, we estimate that 90% of
systems administration tasks in terms of base node provisioning
and deployment have been automated.

3.1.1.2. Distributed Data Structure Cluster

3.1.1.5. Networked Storage Infrastructure

Another facet of CORE is that ensures horizontal scalability is a
distributed data structure (key-value) cluster. Multiple
infrastructure components, such as distributed lock mechanisms or
the overlay network technology between competitor containers
rely on the cluster nodes for storage. Currently, the data structure
cluster is co-located on the base nodes that serve production
traffic. With enough demand, we plan to migrate the cluster to
dedicated servers such that a) the blast radius of a data structure
node failure does not affect the production environment, b)
dedicated solid-state drives increase random IOPS (Input/Output
per Second) performance, and c) the ability to scale the cluster
independent of the production base nodes.

We have noticed several issues pertaining to the deployment of
Docker containers in terms of a storage footprint. The most
prominent was the Docker image utilization – on average, a
container supporting the king of the hill exercise consumes ≈ 1GB
of disk space on a base node. As more exercises are deployed, this
would become burdersome – especially if the other exercises
consume 1-5GB each. Given the industry’s stance on minimalist
containers, 1-5GB of disk usage per image is rather uncomforting
and is not scalable in regards to base node storage. We will
perform tests on pointing base nodes to networked storage, instead
of having the Docker images residing locally on each base node.
Various companies have already developed solutions, such as
3

NetApp over NFS [15]. Alternatively, products such as JFrog’s
Artifactory [16] or Sonatype’s Nexus [17] support centralized
private Docker image registries.

CentOS, Debian, or Fedora. Furthermore, we expect to perform
security-related kernel parameter tweaking via sysctl.

Another benefit of having networked storage is the ability to
deploy container services, such as the scoring engine, to a
centralized location from which base nodes can pull from, as
opposed to pushing a copy from an operator’s workstation. As a
result, we can further lock down base node network security in
regards to deployments (for instance, base nodes may only access
the storage share).

It is critical that the operating systems across our infrastructure is
patched properly not only for security purposes but also for
systems reliability and performance. Therefore, we integrated
automated patching across all our base nodes. One of the issues
we ran into was ensuring the data structure cluster is intact when
the updates take place. A binary semaphore, which resides on the
data structure cluster, is obtained when a host goes down for a
restart, and is released once the hosts returns to active service.
This ensures the cluster is healthy during the maintenance period.

3.2.4.

3.1.1.6. Container Network Fabric
To address the need for competitor box network interconnection,
we have deployed a Layer 3 overlay network between the
containers. For instance, in the king of the hill exercise, all
competitors are placed on the same network segment, allowing for
offensive/defensive operations to occur without having to pivot to
another network segment. Other exercises, such as
offensive/defensive scenarios, can be placed on a diverse network
segment. We are evaluating the Virtual Extensible Local Area
Network (VXLAN) [18] to provide Layer 2 network
segmentation. In a VXLAN deployment, we are able to statically
define Virtual Network Identifiers (VNIs) such that each exercise
is mapped to exactly one VNI. L3 tunnel endpoints, known as
VTEPs (Virtual Tunnel End Points), perform encapsulation and
de-encapsulation of the tagged frames. Only the destination VTEP
will receive frames. Layer 2 frames are then forwarded based on
normal forwarding rules thereafter.

3.2.5.

4. CORE – CONTEST PLATFORM
4.1. Competition Implementation
CORE supports real-time cyberoperations contest so the
competitors attack, defend, and perform live forensics task.
Typical CORE competition instance is organized in two 45
minute sessions of competing sessions and one 15-minute
intermission between. The CORE proof-of-concept competition
infrastructure is shown in Figure 2.

Since CORE is intended to handle malicious computer network
operations in an isolated manner, we took a defense-in-depth
design approach within CORE’s network and systems
infrastructure. Time-series based monitoring allows us to quickly
pinpoint systems anomalies and performance bottlenecks.

From a network traffic perspective, CORE administrators access
the admin console over SSH, while the competitors access the
competition console over HTTP. We are aware that competitors
might try to capture competition traffic; we plan to implement
authentication to the REST API so clients will be forbidden from
making GET or POST requests without authentication. At a later
date, HTTPS will be implemented on the competition
administrator node.

SSL VPN Infrastructure

All users must establish a SSL VPN session to our production
network (see Figure 1); split tunneling will ensure separation from
other networks involved from a client’s perspective. Currently,
these VPN sessions are terminated at a firewall hosted in a colocation, but given the CPU resources required for SSL
termination, we are exploring highly available VPN solutions.

3.2.2.

Internal Services Security

4.1.1.

As already noted, load balancers will be hardened in the sense that
access control lists (ACLs) on the load balancing services will be
implemented. Competitors will be assigned a container to access
(user credentials will be provisioned to the user when they register
for the competition). Furthermore, we have also mentioned of
availing the least connection load balancing algorithm to ensure
only one user session is active to a container at any given time.
We are also exploring the possibility of running Transport Layer
Security across all CORE links.

3.2.3.

Systems Monitoring

To monitor the performance of CORE base nodes, we have
implemented a time-series based cloud monitoring solution to
alert an “on-call engineer” in the event a base node, or a core
infrastructure service on it, has failed or is in a degraded state.
We rely extensively on StatsD [19]. for the collection of system
performance metrics on the base nodes. Monitoring thresholds
are continuously being refined to ensure the on-call engineer is
informed about any system anomaly; efforts to automate response
of such events are currently being explored. We are also
evaluating data collectors and alerting/archiving/analysis solutions
for system logs.

3.2. Infrastructure Security and Monitoring

3.2.1.

Automated Host Updates

Competition Administrator Console

The CORE competition administrator console has two main
functions: 1) container management (as explained in section 3),
and 2) competition management through the competition console.
Within the competition console there are several modules:

Base Node Security

Standard host network traffic filtering will be achieved by
integrating robust iptables rulesets, which will be evaluated as
part of the system provisioning automation. The base node
operating system we selected has automated host updates (see
next section) and overall has a minimal footprint in terms of
functionality when compared to other distributions such as
4

●

Timing engine – maintains global competition time in
the format in format time_remaining:stage and returns it
over the RESTful API to the Scoring Backend

●

Flag engine – keeps the current state of flags captured
by the competitors

●

MySQL database – keeps the competition information
about current competitors and their current score; it
interfaces the scoring backend over the RESTful API

●

RESTful API – middleware interconnecting the scoring,
timekeeping, and flag progress functions of the

competition; provides also competition progress to the
competitors over the scoring frontend (using
websockets)
●

five seconds. Checks are conducted on each container using the
Docker exec command which allows remote command execution
on containers from the host machine. The goal of the scoring
engine is for the checks to be conducted in real-time. Our current
timing is achieved through a pool of four processes among which
the containers are split evenly. A full cycle of checks currently
takes five seconds. At the end of each cycle, the scoring engine
reports the score via the REST API to the MySQL database where
is added to the flags’ score and announced to the scoring frontend.

Scoring frontend – competition dashboard

The CORE administrators have a precompiled list of subscribed
competitors according to which the competition access should be
provisioned. Once the gaming boxes are assigned, the competition
console runs a script to starts the each of the above modules and
announces the competition start over the dashboard. The starting
script also adds a dynamically configured unique set of flags to
each of the game boxes.

The current scoring engine implementation (which is multithreaded) uses 10% of server resources on six vCPU resources
(Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPU @ 3.50GHz). In order to run tests,
arbitrary test commands are listed by the REST API, retrieved by
the scoring engine and then are thrown into a list of checks. These
checks are ran on each container via Docker’s exec and is ran
using a subprocess. In order to score for each container in real
time we asynchronously run checks using a pool of workers. We
plan to optimize the scoring engine by modifying the
implementation using multiprocessing frameworks like gevent and
celery (a distributed task queue library). Once we implement
container orchestration, competition administration will be done
from a web interface. The flag engine will be modified to accept
any flags to be added to the machines as well as the flag locations.
The scoring engine will obtain all flag information from the REST
API and inject the flags into their respective locations using the
Docker exec command. All the current competition scores are
predefined in the configuration file.
There is a possibility for users to compromise the scoring engine
by breaking out of the Docker container onto the host
environment. We mitigated this issue by assigning user
namespaces to each competition container. In the case of a
container breakout, a user would have to perform privilege
escalation operations within the host of the Docker containers.

Figure 2: CORE Competition Structure

4.1.2.

CORE Game Box

Each competitor is assigned a game box – Docker container – that
runs Ubuntu 14.04, XFCE Desktop (over VNC), SSH, and Python
2.7. CORE currently uses Ubuntu 14.04 as a base image, but this
is easily changeable. A XFCE desktop environment is enabled so
the competitor can have graphical access to their gaming boxes
over a VNC service. SSH is also enabled as a tool for out-of-band
attacking and defending between the competitors in addition to
the standard administration actions over their game boxes. Python
2.7 is enabled to provide with ability to script and automate
attacks/defenses/forensic analysis. During the competition,
competitors will view the scoring frontend to keep track of the
competition progress and to submit flags.

4.1.3.

4.2. Competition Structure
In CORE, the traditional attack-defend rounds are replaced with
two 45-minute rounds and one 15-minute intermission. The
intermission is introduced to recap with the competitors. This is
particularly important if the CORE platform is used for
educational or training purposes so the CORE administrators
(educators/trainers) can provide additional assistance achieve to
competition objective. In each round, competitors are urged to
perform the following steps:

CORE Scoring

The competition scoring encompasses: 1) capturing other
contender’s flags (attacking), 2) finding their own flags and
hardening their machines (defending), and (3) completing forensic
tasks. Each flag is weighted depending on the level of difficulty it
takes to find. The cumulative competition score is calculated as a
sum of the flags captured and the score of the forensics tasks
performed. The CORE scoring considers any action by the
competitors to start/stop/reconfigure services on the game box,
manipulate the current file system, or system logs reviews as a
forensics tasks and provides additional scores for these.

●

Reconnaissance – this is the initial game box discovery
in the first period and the other competitors

●

Attacking / Defending – capturing flags on others’ game
boxes and deleting the flags on their own

●

Live forensic tasks – system logs reviews, system
reconfiguration

Competitors are free to choose their strategy how the will perform
each of these steps. CORE’s idea is to motivate the competitors to
accomplish each of these so they can maximize their score (or
learning outcome in case the CORE is used for education or
professional training).

To get the score in real time, the scoring backend enumerates all
running containers located on its base node and reaches out to the
timing script through telnet to determine when scoring starts/ends.
The scoring engine then begins a predefined set of checks for a
dynamic set of forensic tasks performed on each container every

5. CORE – TESTING AND ROADMAP
Several key performance indicators (KPI) from the client’s
perspective are being explored for CORE. Because of the prospect
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of being a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) solution for other higher
education institutions, we care deeply about client performance
metrics (for instance, HTTP Time-To-Last-Byte (TTLB)). We are
currently considering synthetic application monitoring (i.e.,
simulated client browser behavior) from various agents hosted in
U.S. data center POPs (points of presence) in order to gain
external network visibility outside of our data center
infrastructure. As a result, we would be enabled to quickly
identify and remediate application performance bottlenecks.
CORE has been initially evaluated in the development
environment we have locally at DePaul. In a recent load test with
a total of 15 competitor boxes running one exercise concurrently,
roughly 26% of the development base nodes’ six vCPU resources
(Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPU @ 3.50GHz) were utilized. The
competitor containers which contained the exercise consumed
1.283GB of memory on the development base node. Compared to
the results in [4], CORE is showing similar and promising
performance by keeping the memory consumption average
relatively constant at 641.93MB for hosting 15 players with fixed
number of services throughout the entire competition time.
For the future CORE development, we plan to allow for
competitors organize and compete in teams. We also plan to have
bots to run predefined exploits against the competitors. Our
objective is to optimize the scoring engine to run asynchronously
in real-time. Another aspect we plan to work is the dependability
and the resilience of the CORE platform so to prevent from
container malfunctioning and system calls manipulation
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“Scalable and lightweight CTF infrastructures using
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[14]
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320, 2014.

[15]
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[16]
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[19]

Etsy,
“StatsD.”
[Online].
Available:
https://github.com/etsy/statsd. [Accessed: 05-Oct-2017].

6. CONCLUSION
The CORE platform was developed as an effort to overcome the
current administration burden when organizing attack-defense
CTFs and the lack of true cyberoperations competitions in realtime. CORE achieves these design objectives by containerizing
the competitors’ game boxes and structuring the competition with
distinct reconnaissance, attacking, defending, and forensic tasks.
The CORE platform can be used for various purposes:
competitions of varying scale, educational experiential learning,
professional training and development, and skill-set assessments.
Educators can use CORE teach attacking, defending, and various
cyberoperations tactics. Developers, system administrators, and
security professionals can use CORE to host competitions within
their organization in order to promote security awareness in an
amusing and competitive manner. CORE can be of benefit for a
secure development lifecycle as it provides a flexible platform for
customized threat analysis and scenario testing.
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